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Abstract 
This article explores the responsibility of military or civilian superiors in international 
criminal law for their failure to act in relation to a potentially lethal virus epidemic or 
pandemic. In this direction, two different angles of the issue are discussed. The first 
focuses on the responsibility of individuals in positions of power for their failure to prevent 
the spread of the virus or provide adequate health support to an epidemic or pandemic 
affected population, when this population is used as a target group for the commission of 
crimes against humanity, war crimes or even genocide. The second refers to the 
responsibility of these superiors for their failure to prevent their subordinates to use such 
an epidemic or pandemic as a mean to commit crimes against humanity or war crimes. It 
is argued that, in order for superior responsibility to be attributed in these circumstances, 
a careful consideration on the theory of omission and the nature of superior responsibility 
is required. 
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I. Introduction  
 
This paper considers the international criminal law issues epidemics and pandemics raise 
with reference to the responsibility of specific individuals for the commission of international 
crimes.1 The discussion on how pandemics/epidemics are linked to international criminal 
responsibility has been prompted by the current Covid-19 situation, but it can relate to 
2 In order 
to explain the focus of the paper, it is useful to clarify first how an epidemic or a pandemic 
is linked to international criminality. By their construction, international crimes cover a 
limited number of human rights violations. These limitations are two-fold: in terms of their 
elements, international crimes have a specific actus reus and a specific mens rea.3 In 
1 The international criminal law analysis of this paper focuses primarily on the Statute and case law of the 
International Criminal Court, which is currently the only permanent international criminal tribunal, with 
potential universal jurisdiction - subject to state membership.  
2 re than 1 million cases so far, a 





https://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/about_disease/en/, accessed 7 May 
2020.  
3 See Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) for the actus reus of 
the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; and Article 30 for the mens 
rea of international crimes, which as a general rule is intent of the first or second degree-excluding dolus 
eventualis/recklessness and negligence. 
to be conducted under the specific genocidal intent;4 crimes against humanity have to be 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population;5 and war crimes require a belligerent nexus, i.e. to be closely related to the 
hostilities of an international or non-international armed conflict.6  
 
reach the level of international crimes. In terms of the current Covid-19 pandemic, a 
number of governments have been accused of policy failures leading to mass unnecessary 
deaths, posing the question of whether their leaders can be accused for the commission 
of crimes against humanity.7 Leaving aside the mens rea requirements of international 
crimes - and even in the rare scenario that a government has intentionally allowed the 
spread of Covid-19 in the country -
the basis of a crime against humanity. This is because there is a lack of a widespread or 
systematic attack against civilians, with knowledge of this attack: inadequate measures 
against the spread of Covid-19 in a country (even if the inadequacy is intentional) cannot 
be considered as a purposeful attack of the state mechanism against the whole population 
of this country. The relatively high standard of widespread or systematic attack 
distinguishes crimes against humanity from human rights violations, and its fulfilment 
requires attack against a specific civilian group -instead of the whole civilian population of 
a country in general - 8 for 
crimes against humanity in international law.9  
 
Exploring further the notion of attack, another possibility arises, even though it is not a 
Covid-19 feature: the scenario of a state unleashing a deadly virus against the population 
of another state as an act of aggression.10 Aggression is considered an international crime 
the use of armed force by a State and, in particular, the invasion or attack by the armed 
forces of a State of the territory of another State.11 Even though an interpretative expansion 
ible, it 
exceeds the scope of this paper. By applying, hence, strictly, the elements of the crime of 
4 Article 6 of the ICC Statute: "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. 
5 Article 7 of the ICC Statute. 
6 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Trial Chamber Judgment), ICTY, IT-96-23 & 23/1, 22 February 2001, para. 
402. 
7 
The Independent, 10 April 2020;  Brazilian Association of Jurists for 
3 April 2020, https://peoplesdispatch.org/2020/04/03/bolsonaro-denounced-for-crimes-against-humanity-
before-the-international-criminal-court/
The Independent, 2 May 2020.  
8 With the exception of persecution as a crime against humanity, see  (Trial 
Chamber Judgment), ICTY, IT-95-16, 14 January 2000, para. 606. 
9  A more extended discussion on the nature of crimes against humanity and of international crimes in 
general, however, is out of the scope of this paper and is not fit for the purposes of this collective 
publication. 
10 
conspiracy theories a The Washington Post, 27 April 2020.  
11 See, Article 8bis (2)(a) of the ICC Statute, as well as the remaining sub-paragraphs (b-)(g), all of which 
 
aggression, a leader of a country cannot be found criminally responsible in international 
law.  
 
For these reasons, the analysis of this paper focuses on s
as part of a(n) (state) ethnic cleansing campaign, or in order to gain military advantage in 
the armed conflict by targeting civilians. These scenarios fulfill the elements and conditions 
of the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, as 
previously presented. More specifically, the paper explores the potential responsibility of 
superiors - state leaders and military commanders - for the commission of these 
international crimes by taking advantage of an outbreak of an epidemic or pandemic. Such 
incidents are already taking place when epidemics strike, and this is a reality international 
criminal law needs to seriously take into consideration. In the ongoing hostilities in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed groups have refused access of humanitarian 
and medical personnel and their supplies to specific populations amidst the Ebola 
epidemic. The extent of these incidents and their links to crimes against humanity and war 
crimes led to the adoption of UN Resolution 2439 (2018), where the Security Council warns 
of the illegality of such practices and requests the responsible parties to cease this 
practice.12 Since the beginning of the war in Yemen, the parties to the conflict have been 
attacking humanitarian and medical personnel fighting against the cholera outbreak. They 
have also banned medical supplies and denied the affected population access to 
treatment.13 In any case, targeting a civilian population by preventing their access to 
medical help is a common war tactic, and a violation of international humanitarian law.14  
 
Discussing the responsibility of superiors in these circumstances, the article establishes a 
distinction between responsibility of a superior as a participant to the international crime 
and as a perpetrator of a separate crime of dereliction of duty. Identifying a clear theoretical 
framework for this distinction is important, as a superior who is considered a wilful 
participant to an international crime will, naturally, be more severely punished than a 
superior who is a perpetrator to a dereliction of duty crime due to their negligent failure to 
supervise their subordinates adequately. In this direction, it has to be noted that a well-
justified application of the rules of individual criminal responsibility is even more important 
when it comes to international criminal law. International crimes are usually the product of 
collective criminality, where there are individuals in hierarchical positions who are remote 
from the crime scene but are, nevertheless, responsible for ordering or allowing their 
commission. Having in place an international criminal law theory to link these individuals 
to the international crimes is of utmost importance for international justice. 
 
II. Direct and Indirect Superior Responsibility in International Criminal Law  
 
In international criminal law, an individual, who has a position of authority can be 
responsible for the commission of an international crime, as a superior and/or together with 
the physical perpetrator(s). In this sense, the superior is a perpetrator when they have 
12 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2439 (2018), UN Doc. S/RES/2439 (2018), 30 October 
2018. 
13 World Report 2019: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-
chapters/yemen, accessed 30 April 2020,.   
14 
has been a widespread tactic by both parties to the con
The Huffington Post, 10 April 2013. 
control over the criminal outcome, as any other individual, or, due to their position, when 
they have control over the will and acts of their subordinates.15 In the latter case, the 
concepts of ordering, soliciting or inducing the commission of an international crime are 
also relevant.16 
because the superior becomes responsible for their participation in the crime through their 
own deliberate acts or omissions.    
 
When it comes to omissions, it has to be noted that criminal law recognises the commission 
of international crimes not only through actions, but also through omissions. Law is a 
normative pursuit and, thus, its rules are not limited to a mere description of physical acts.17 
Criminal responsibility is attached to the individual for his or her conscious contribution to 
the crime committed. This means that, in certain circumstances, a lack of action in the 
sense of omission can contribute to the criminal outcome in the same way as an act of 
commission.18 he crime, which 
19 and the 
20 
 
Nevertheless, the omissions of a superior can also entail criminal responsibility for them 
21 
22 In the case of indirect superior responsibility, 
responsibility attaches to the superior, not for their own omissions leading to the criminal 
outcome, but for their failure to prevent the acts of their subordinates who eventually 
committed the crime. In other words, the superior responsibility doctrine refers to the 
responsibility of the superiors - regardless of whether they are military commanders or 
civilian leaders - for their failure to effectively control their subordinates and take 
reasonable and adequate steps to prevent the commission of the crime, or to punish them 
after the crime has been committed. 
 
This latter type of superior responsibility - failure to prevent or punish - has led to significant 
uncertainty in international criminal law regarding the attribution of criminal responsibility 
to the superior.23 This is because the duty of the superior to supervise their subordinates, 
15 See Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Pre-Trial Chamber II), 
 Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor 
Against Jean- -01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 347; Prosecutor v 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Pre- -01/04-01/06, 
29 January 2007, paras. 326-341; Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Pre-Trial 
-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008, paras. 480-
86. 
16 See Article 25(3)(b) of the ICC Statute. 
17 Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol I: Foundations and General Part (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 180-81. 
18 See, George Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 51. 
19 Regarding English law see, for example, R v Stone & Dobinson (1977) QB 354; R v Gibbins & Proctor 
(1918) 13 Cr App Rep 134, where it has been discussed how crimes of active conduct can be committed 
by omission. 
20 unechtes Unterlassung
section 13 of the German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB). 
21 See, Commentary of the International Law Commission on Art. 6 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996), para. 1.  
22 See Article 28 of the ICC Statute. 
23 Volker Nerlich, 'Superior Responsibility under Article 28 ICC Statute: For What exactly is the superior 
held responsible?' (2007) 5(3)  Journal of International Criminal Justice 665
responsibility  
which would have enabled them to prevent their crimes in the first place, can give rise to 
a different type of responsibility as well: that of commission of a separate crime of 
dereliction of duty.24 Indeed, in criminal law, there are certain crimes that can be committed 
only through an omission: there are situations, where an individual by omitting to act allows 
for a certain outcome to take place, a behaviour which the law feels should be punishable. 
One such example -which is criminalised by several, but not all jurisdictions- is when an 
individual fails to save someone who finds themselves in danger, when the act of saving 
can be done without the individual risking their own life.25 In these type of crimes, the 
perpetrator is responsible not for the outcome but solely for their inaction, which allowed 
26 where the individual becomes the perpetrator of a special crime of 
dereliction of duty - a duty that has been created by each particular authentic omission 
crime.  
   
After explaining this distinction, the next section analyses the responsibility of military 
commanders and civilian leaders, based on Article 28 of the ICC Statute, in order to apply 
the suggested theoretical framework to Covid-19 related scenarios in the last section. 
 
III. Analysing the Responsibility of the Superior in Article 28 of the ICC Statute   
 
In contrast to the ad hoc criminal tribunals, which approached the notion of superior in a 
unified approach, Article 28 of the ICC Statute distinguishes between the responsibility of 
military commanders (subparagraph(a)) and the responsibility of civilian superiors 
(subparagraph (b)). The main difference is that military commanders can be found 
responsible, not only for the intentional failure to prevent the crimes of their subordinates 
or to punish them, but also for their negligent failure (should have known standard). On the 
contrary, a civilian superior can be found responsible only when their failure has been 
intentional, or they were wilfully blind to the crimes of their subordinates (must have known 
standard).  
 
Based on the analysis of the previous section on the types of omissions in criminal law, it 
is suggested that the different levels of mens rea of the superior regarding their control 
over the crimes of their subordinates can lead to different types of superior responsibility. 
When a superior, either a military commander or a civilian leader, knows that their 
subordinates are about to commit a crime and they purposefully refrain from intervening, 
then this omission is, in fact, an act in disguise, in other words an inauthentic omission, 
leading to commission (of the crime) by omission. Therefore, the intentional omission of 
the superior to prevent the crime of others constitutes participation in the crime, under the 
same principles governing perpetration and/or ordering. It is proposed that this type of 
superior responsibility can be interpreted as covering the situation where an individual 
Arnold and others (eds), Menschengerechtes Strafrecht: Festschrift für Albin Eser zum 70 
Geburtstag(München: C.H. Beck, 2005); Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility in International Criminal 
Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010);  
and John R.W.D. Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Maria L. Nybondas, Command Responsibility and its 
Applicability to Civilian Superiors (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010). 
24 See, for example, Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, (n. 17) 231. 
25 See, for example Art. 223 of the French Criminal Code; Section 323(c) German Strafgesetzbuch. 
26 (eds) Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 
Volume 1: Anglo-German Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2020), 20-21. 
capable of exercising control over others, intentionally fails to do so.27 Under the proposed 
framework, the notion of control is crucial because it provides the causal link between the 
inauthentic omission of the superior and the criminal outcome by the acts of the 
subordinates. Such a causal link is required to establish principal participation in the 
crime.28 The individual who has effective control over others and consciously allows them 
(or fails to take reasonable steps to prevent) to commit a crime is, without a doubt, linked 
to the criminal outcome as much as the physical perpetrator is.29 
 
In the case of military commanders, however, Article 28(a) of the ICC Statute renders them 
responsible for negligence as well. In this case, there is no doctrinal basis for commission 
by omission, as explained in the previous section. A superior should not be responsible for 
the crime of others if he/she was not aware of them, even if he/she neglected in his/her 
duty to supervise them properly. Arguing otherwise would create a type of vicarious liability, 
where the individual lacks the appropriate mens rea for the commission of the crime. Such 
a liability contrasts, nevertheless, with the criminal law principle of personal culpability, 
which 30 As in national criminal law,31 an 
individual should be found responsible only for their specific share to the commission of 
an international crime.32  
 
It is proposed, in the latter case, that the military commander should be responsible for a 
separate dereliction of duty crime, for neglecting to properly supervise his or her 
subordinates. This due diligence duty emanates from the superior-subordinate 
33 
The same conclusion can be drawn regarding the responsibility of both military 
commanders and civilian leaders when it comes to their failure to punish their subordinates 
after the crime commission. As the superior cannot be a perpetrator to a crime that has 
already been committed, their omission to punish their subordinates can only be 
punishable as a separate crime of dereliction of their relevant superior duties. 
 
The dualistic interpretation of Article 28 of the ICC Statute proposed in this article has a 
clear advantage in the context of the attribution of responsibility in international criminal 
law. It incorporates the superior responsibility doctrine in the general theoretical framework 
27 See also, Meloni (n. 23), 197-98. However, she limits the responsibility of the superior in such a case to 
accomplice liability and excludes principal liability, 198.  
28 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Trial Chamber II), -
01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014, para. 767. 
29 
has the factual possibility and is aware that he can step out of his or her passivity and become active in a 
 
30 Allison Danner and Jenny Martinez, 'Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enerprise, Command 
Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal Law', (2005) 93(1) California Law Review 75, 
134. 
31 See Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of criminal law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013) 182. 
32 According to the Appeals Chamber in Tadic
much as in national systems the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: 
nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged 
or in some way participated (nulla poen Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgment) ICTY, 
IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1995, para. 186. 
33 -
which establishes a specific relationship between two parties and, thus, certain duties of the one towards 
the other. See Sutradhar v Natural Environment Research Council [2006] UKHL 33, paras. 38, 48. 
on the modes of responsibility. Attributing responsibility to the superior in relation to 
sui generis doctrine of individual criminal 
responsibility, constituting an exception to the modes of participation in international 
criminal law.34 Instead, it follows the basic criminal law rule of personal culpability, 
according to which, an individual becomes criminally responsible when their own acts and 
minds are sufficiently linked to the criminal outcome.35  
 
IV. How does superior responsibility relate to pandemic-affected international 
crimes? 
 
As explained in the introduction, the spread of a virus such as Covid-19 and the 
consequent outbreak of an epidemic or a pandemic can be used as a tool or provide the 
context for the commission of international crimes. In such a case, international criminal 
law can attribute responsibility to military commanders or superior leaders, either for crimes 
committed via their own omissions or for failure to prevent the crimes of their subordinates.  
 
Based on the doctrinal analysis of omission and superior responsibility in the previous 
sections, the following scenario may occur. In the middle of a state campaign to eliminate 
a specific minority group within a certain geographical area, the civilian leader of the state 
deliberately omits to prevent the spread of a deadly virus among this population or 
deliberately omits to adopt the required health measures in order to fight the pandemic or 
epidemic. Such a deliberate omission is considered as an act in disguise, an inauthentic 
omission, according to the analysis provided in the first section. Thus, the superior can be 
responsible for the commission of a crime against humanity by omission, i.e. extermination 
by deprivation of access to medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population36 and/or persecution by intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental 
rights,37 as is the right to health.38 This is the case of direct superior responsibility,39 as the 
superior is in a position to effectively control the state apparatus and deliberately refrains 
from ordering the state services to introduce the appropriate measures against the virus. 
If this state campaign has also a genocidal intent against a specific population  the intent 
to destroy a group as such40 - then the superior can be found responsible for the 
commission of genocide, in addition to crimes against humanity and/or war crimes, 
depending on the facts.  
 
This scenario can be linked to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, where the Rohingya 
population is facing a widespread/systematic attack by the Myanmar security forces.41 In 
this direction, the state deliberately refrains from providing health care to the Rohingya 
and/or prevents their access to it.42 Under the current Covid-19 pandemic, this would mean 
34 n Otto 
Triffterer (ed), 
Article by Article (3rd ed. Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), 1060. 
35  (Appeal Judgment), (n. 32), para. 186. 
36 See Articles 7(1)(b) and 7(2)(b) of the ICC Statute. 
37 See Articles 7(1)(h) and 7(2)(g) of the ICC Statute. 
38 See Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200A 
(XXI),16 December 1966. 
39 See Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute. 
40 See Article 6 of the ICC Statute. 
41 June 2020,  https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-
tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar.  
42 https://www.hrw.org/tag/rohingya-crisis, accessed 2 June 2020.  
that the Rohingya community is left unprotected against the spread of the disease.43 In 
case of a Covid-19 death toll in the Rohingya area, the deliberate omissions of the state 
leaders could render them responsible as perpetrators of crimes against humanity: 
extermination by deprivation of access to medicine, calculated to bring about the Rohingya 
population destruction; and/or persecution of this group by intentional and severe 
deprivation of their right to health. It has to be also noted that there are allegations of the 
Rohingya persecution having reached the level of genocide.44 If the genocidal intent of 
destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, is 
proved, then the omissions of the state leaders regarding the protection of the Rohingya 
against Covid-
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 45 If this is the case, 
then the leaders can be responsible for the commission of genocide by omission. 
 
A similar scenario can apply regarding detention centres and forced labour camps in 
oppressive states. In Eritrea, for example, it is estimated that there exist more than 200 
detention facilities for political prisoners arbitrarily detained by the state. The sanitary 
provisions and medical aid to prisoners are almost non-existent, while torturing and killing 
of prisoners is a common practice. In these conditions, it can be argued that the state 
seeks to exterminate or, in any case, persecute these detainees in a systematic way. Due 
to the current spread of Covid-19 around the world, NGOs warn that the refusal of the 
government to provide adequate health care renders the detainees defenceless against 
the pandemic.46 If there is indeed a spread of Covid-19 in these detention centres, then 
the deliberate omissions of the state leaders to provide medical aid to the infected can be 
characterised as extermination by deprivation of access to medicine or persecution via 
deprivation of their right to health. Based on the theoretical framework developed in the 
previous section of this paper, these leaders can be responsible as perpetrators of 
inauthentic omission crimes against humanity. 
 
The situation described in the previous scenarios is rather straightforward, as long as the 
(inauthentic) omissions of the superior are sufficiently linked to the criminal outcome and 
can be, thus, treated as acts. The issues arise when we turn to analyse a similar scenario 
under the umbrella of indirect superior responsibility (Article 28 of the ICC statute). 
Consider the following scenario: in a war-torn country, a belligerent group is in control of a 
particular area, which in
epidemic/pandemic that is already present in the country reaches these villages. The 
soldiers of the belligerent group use the presence of the virus to their advantage and 
prevent the affected population from seeking health care and/or do not allow NGOs access 
to the village in order to provide it. As a result, the majority of the civilian population dies. 
Willful killing of civilians and impediment of humanitarian relief to civilians in need are 
43 -
the armed conflict in Myanmar leaves the persecuted ethnic minorities unprotected against the coronavirus 
pandemic, Deutsche Welle, 7 May 2020. 
44 -
UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, 12 September 2018. 
45 Article 6(c) of the ICC Statute. 
46 ions Defenceless 
against COVID- https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/eritrea-detainees-in-
overcrowded-and-unsanitary-conditions-defenceless-against-covid19/.  
considered grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the customary humanitarian 
law resulting in the commission of war crimes.47  
 
This scenario can materialise in Yemen where there is a long-standing conflict between 
the state forces and belligerent groups. Humanitarian organisations in the country report 
that the armed groups involved in the hostilities continue to target health care facilities and 
block access to humanitarian aid, despite the pleas of the international community to 
protect civilians from Covid-19 infection and prevent the spread of the virus in the region.48 
In this direction, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued an appeal for a global 
ceasefire so that populations most vulnerable to the spread of Covid-19 can have access 
to humanitarian aid.49  
 
Following the analysis of Article 28 in section III above, it is apparent that in case there is 
spread of Covid-
different sets of circumstances. This depends on the mens rea of the individual who 
exercises effective control over the physical perpetrators. If the military commander is 
aware or wilfully blind of the acts of their subordinates leading to the commission of war 
crimes and they deliberately refrain from stopping them, then their omission is in any case 
a disguised act, an inauthentic omission. Indeed, if the military commander decided to 
intervene and stop the subordinates under their control, then the crime would not have 
been committed. Therefore, in case of their inaction, the military commander should be 
found responsible- alongside with their soldiers- for commission of war crimes, as a 
perpetrator who is in control of the criminal outcome.  
 
However, if the military commander does not know about the acts of their subordinates, 
because they have been negligent in their duty to supervise them properly, they cannot be 
considered as participants to the war crime, due to the lack of intent towards the crime.  In 
this case, Article 28 (a) establishes a new crime, that of dereliction of duty, which the 
military commander can be found responsible for. As the military commander is not 
responsible for an international crime his/her sentence should be considerably shorter than 
that of his/her soldiers who committed the war crime. Finally, responsibility for the 
dereliction of duty crime of Article 28 is attached to the military commander if he/she also 
omits to punish their subordinates after he/she finds out that they have committed the war 
crime. This is because a responsible commander has also a duty to punish his/her soldiers 
when they violate the laws of war50 and Article 28 incorporates this duty in the ICC Statute.   
 
The advantage of this approach cannot be ignored. Establishing the commission of 
international crimes amidst a humanitarian crisis is complex enough as it is, but it presents 
even more difficulties when it is escalated by the chaos an epidemic outbreak can create 
in volatile conditions. Having a solid theory to rely upon when it comes to the contribution 
of superiors in the crime commission is an undeniable asset for their successful 
prosecution under international criminal law and their final conviction.  
47 See Article 8(2)(a), (b)(xxv), (c)(i), (e)(iii) of the ICC Statute, depending on whether there is an 
international or non-international armed conflict. 
48 -19 in Yemen  
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/14/covid-19-yemen-perfect-storm. 
49 -  23 
March 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/03/1059972. 
50 See, for example, Art 86 and 87 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.  
V. Conclusion  
 
against an epidemic or a pandemic, when a virus outbreak is used for or aids the 
commission of international crimes. In these circumstances, the omissions of the superiors 
- military commanders and civilian leaders - to prevent the spread of the virus or their 
failure to control their subordinates can render them responsible in international criminal 
ntrol over the criminal outcome and/or 
over the physical perpetrators can establish their responsibility either for commission of an 
international crime by omission or for a separate crime of dereliction of duty, depending on 
mens rea for the underlying international crime.   
 
  
